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 i 
摘 要 
 
政治世家是指有数个家庭成员参与政治、选举政治(如父/母、儿/女参与国家立法和治理)
的家庭。他们在民主政治中的崛起与统治与民主代表相关，尤其与治理水平密切联系。 
 
本文通过分析 1996年至 2015年亚洲地区的相关资料，考察了政治王朝与选举的关系。将
政治王朝作为主要自变量，将选民份额及治理水平作为因变量，通过线性回归衡量和理解
它们之间的关系。研究结果表明，与非政治王朝竞争者相比，拥有政治王朝背景的候选人
在选举上更有优势。此外，亲属中有担任前首相/总统的当选首相/总统对经济和社会发展
治理的影响力更高。 
 
关键字：政治王朝；选举份额；治理 
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Abstract 
 
Political dynasty is a family which several members are involved in politics, electoral politics 
with father/mother – son/daughter alike involved in state legislature and administration 
(executive). Their rise and dominance in a democratic institution has been a concern in 
democratic representation and worst, the quality of governance.  
 
This paper examines the relationship between political dynasty and election data from 1996 to 
2015 in Asian background. We use political dynasty as our main independent variable and 
regress against both voter share and governance to evaluate and to understand their relationship. 
Result shows that the candidates from political dynasty background have electoral advantage 
compared to their non-dynastic competitor. In addition, elected prime minister/president with 
relative who is a previous prime minister/president has stronger impact on economic and social 
development governance.  
 
Key Words: Political Dynasty; Voter Share; Governance  
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Chapter 1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Political dynasty is a family which several members of the family are involved in politics with 
father/mother – son/daughter alike involved in state legislature and administration (executive). 
Members may be related by blood or marriage; often several generations or multiple siblings 
may be involved. The successes of these political dynasties have long relied on political 
connection for advancement in their political career in Asia. It is estimated that 50% to 70% of 
all civil positions (politicians, lawmakers) in Philippines are held by members of connected 
dynasties (Querobin, 2013). Despite no official statistic, Sri Lanka have several prominent 
political families serving at the federal level such Rajapaksa, Bandaranaike, Gopallawa and 
Jayewardene. In India and Indonesia, provincial level dynasties are mushrooming (Hariyadi, 
2015). Table 1 summarizes the list of prominent Asian political dynasties. 
 
Scholars argue that the rise of a political dynasty is partly due to the incompatibility of 
democracy with the Asian culture, an imbalance between the legislature and the executive and 
the still-exist feudalist system in the country. The prevalence of traditional social structure made 
the political system democratic only on the “surface” but under it is a hierarchical and elitist 
political order (Shin, 2013; Huang, 2009). Crouch (1996) cited the case of Malaysia;  
 
 “The constitutional framework of the Malaysian political system is essentially democratic. 
Elections have been held regularly, the government is responsible to an elected parliament, and 
the judiciary is constitutionally independent. But the democratic framework is accompanied by a 
wide range of authoritarian controls that greatly limit the scope for effective political opposition 
and make it very difficult to envisage the defeat of the ruling party at the polls.”  
 
Regardless old or new, transparency and democratic values are not embodied within the state 
institution of Asian countries (Huang, 2009).  Low income per capita tempts the public officer to 
be corrupt and leads to vote trading. These conditions gave rise to a political dynasty (Tusalem 
and Pe-Aguirre, 2013; Jetter, Agudelo and Hassan, 2015). The emphasis on political relationship 
limits the economic development of these countries (Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap, 2012). 
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Others maintain that dynasties reduce competiveness within the political system and hinder 
socio-economic reform policies and growth (Teehankee, 2007; Mendoza, 2013). 
 
Table 1: Examples of Prominent Political Dynasties in Asia  
Country 
Political Dynasty with Position and Term Date 
 1
st
 Generation   2
nd
 Generation 
Bangladesh 
Sheikh Mujibur, President 
(1971-1972, 1975) 
Sheikh Hasina, PM 
(1996-2001, 2006-Present) 
India 
Indira Gandhi, PM (2
nd
 Generation) 
(1980 – 1984) 
Rajiv Gandhi, PM (3
rd
 Generation) 
(1984-1989) 
Indonesia 
Sukarno, President  
(1945-1967) 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, President 
(2001-2004) 
Japan 
Shintaro Abe, Minister (2
nd
 Generation) 
(1982-1986) 
Shinzo Abe, PM (3
rd
 Generation) 
(2012-Present) 
Malaysia 
Abdul Razak, PM  
(1970-1976) 
Najib Razak, PM  
(2009-Present) 
Hussein Onn, PM  
(1976-1981) 
Hishammudin Hussein, Current 
Minister under Najib’s Cabinet 
Maldives  
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President 
(1978-2008) 
Abdulla Yameen, President 
(2013-Present) 
Nepal 
Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala, PM 
(1959-1960) 
Girija Prasad Koirala, PM 
(1991-1994, 1998-1999,  
2000-2001, 2006-2008) 
Philippine 
Vicente Duterte, Davao Governor 
(1959-1965) 
Rodrigo Duterte, President  
(2016-Present) 
Singapore 
Lee Kuan Yew, PM  
(1959-2011) 
Lee Hsien Loong, PM  
(2004-Present) 
Sri Lanka 
D.A Rajapaksa, Minister  
(1947-1965) 
Mahindra Rajapaksa, President 
 (2005-2015) 
South Korea Park Chung-Hee, President  Park Geun-Hye, President  
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(1963-1979) (2013-Present) 
Taiwan 
Ma Ho Ling, Minister  
(N/A) 
Ma Ying Jeou, President  
(2008-2016) 
Thailand 
Thaksin Shinawatra, PM  
(2001-2006) 
Yingluck Shinawatra, PM  
(2011-2014) 
Pakistan 
Nawaz Sharif, PM  
(1990-1993, 1997-1999, 2013-Present) 
Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister 
(1997-1999, 2008-Present) 
Hamza Shahbaz Sharif, MP  
(Son of Shahbaz Sharif,  
Niece of Nawaz Sharif) 
(2013-Present) 
 
Even though democracy promotes one-person-one-vote, member of political dynasties tend to 
vote into party because of the backing of senior political party leaders whom are their parents.  
Once they are elected into house of representative, they are being put in priority list for 
ministerial job. Democracy is nothing but a way for dynastical family to bring more family 
members into politic to solidify and rejuvenate party position. Thus, this paper is split into two 
groups of studies. The first group investigates the electoral performance of party under dynastic 
leader versus party under non-dynastic leader during election in Asian setting (Feinstein, 2010; 
Asako et al., 2013; Daniele, 2015) or rather to see whether voter have a demonstrable preference 
for dynastic leaders.  The second group examines whether elected dynastic leader (PM/president) 
choose different policies and induce different economic outcomes compared to elected non-
dynastic leader as there is an expectation that countries governed by dynastic leader to be 
different from countries governed by non-dynastic leader in many dimensions. Discovering the 
answer for these questions will help to suggest to lawmakers on how best to act constitutionally 
against the control of political families and deficit of country democracy.   
 
1.2 Literature Review 
There are many published literatures regarding about political dynasties, covering the aspect of 
political science to economy. However, much of the literatures focus predominantly on how and 
why political dynasties arise, rather than how they persist in long term. For instance, in the 
Philippine, Mendoza et al. (2012) explored the relationship between poverty and political 
dynasties and found that poverty lead to formation of a political family. The formations of a 
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political dynasty then exacerbate bad governance, failing to reduce poverty and deepen poverty 
condition (Albert et al., 2015; Albert and Martinez, 2015). Complement with democratic 
institution, poverty then boost the expansion of the largest and strongest political dynasties due 
to the vulnerability of the poor being enticed into vote buying, which benefits the political 
dynasties (Mendoza et al., 2012). In contrast, vote selling is deemed necessary to avoid possible 
violence or threat from happening or its escalation (Beckett, 1994). Improving economic 
condition in the Philippines does not result in dissolution of political dynasties or emergence of 
new political dynasties but will strengthen democratic institution and indirectly weaken political 
dynasties in the long run by preventing them from endorsing their political agenda into various 
government and non-government institutions (Mendoza et al., 2012; Dal Bo et al., 2009).   
In different situation, the formation of a political family arise is linked to low education level in 
the country, Blaydes (2006) examines voter behavior in Egypt and found that illiterates are likely 
to turnout to vote than those who can read. Political elites tend to focus to illiterates as they are 
more easily to entice, coerce and their votes are cheaper to buy. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) 
associated vote buying as client – patron relations where political dynasties tend to distribute 
public goods when scheduled elections are around the corner to generate supports. The authors 
argued that the practice of client – patron only mean on giving the voters the fulfillment of basic 
necessities when demand are voiced during elections rather than improving their quality of life 
during their elected tenure. This provides political dynasties the incentive to pursue distributional 
programs rather than promoting sustainable growth as spending on distributional programs is less 
costly. Although authoritarian elections rarely change their regime, these elections have 
important results, lengthen their rule.  
 
Moreover, there is high possibility that political candidate use their racial/religious background 
as political tool to gain election footing in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country. While 
debates on public policies are often used as a lure, candidates characteristic unavoidably became 
bait for votes (Wantchekon, 2003). Once elected, the leader will guard their racial interest as 
enshrined in state constitution from being tarnish. If the elected leader were to fall, the interest of 
the particular race/religion will fall too. Sometimes, the entire governing system falls because 
both leader and governing system are inseparable (Hood, 1998). This is similar to female 
candidate increasing presence of female voter turnout and vote share to the party (Pande, 2011).  
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
 5 
While some literatures focus on how and why political dynasties arise, some focus on how they 
persist in long term and the aftermath. For instance, Daniele (2015) associated family name and 
political performance (experience) as tools for political dynasties to gain ground and to lengthen 
their stay. The author explained that dynastic politicians have electoral advantage should voters 
have little other information about them. But once there is bad track record of the said politician 
then this leads to a decline in votes in the next elections. They relied on family name as an 
attraction during their first election (perceived ability). As a result, dynastic politicians’ electoral 
advantage should persist – and possibly even strengthen – during later elections when voters can 
obtain information from politicians’ past performance in office (real ability). Others suggest that 
that dynastic politician might have a higher political ability than non-dynastic politicians 
deriving from the fact that they inherit political knowledge, connections and networks from their 
predecessors (Dal Bó et al., 2009; Feinstein, 2010; Asako et al., 2013; Querobin, 2013). It is also 
noted that longer tenure in the house of representative / parliament increases the probability of 
having a relative in future house (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011).    
 
Acemoglu (2012) noted that political dynasty tend to span generations to continue policies 
pursued by previous generation. Policies adopted might be even worse than the predecessor. 
Political dynasties tend to invest in family members to continue their policies, rather than 
strengthening political parties whereby family name is used in election ballots. Mendoza et al., 
(2013) explained that strong track record helped dynastic politicians to stay in power and 
political dynasties often turn reform agendas over to younger generation within the same family. 
Dynastic politicians have incentives to implement policies that will increase their advantage and 
guarantee the perpetuation of power. In countries with weak institutions, this can lead to 
patronage and corruption (Braganca, Ferraz and Rios, 2015). 
 
Mendoza et al. (2012) cited the case of Philippines, where dynastic persistence worsens 
governance. Citizens barred from voicing their demands due to the hierarchical culture. Over 
time, dynastic warlord becomes lawless and gained sustainable power to overshadow execution 
from the state authorities.  The dynasty installs their preferred heir into the political arena 
without the emphasis of meritocracy and results in new generations of political dynasty without 
any experience in governing and leaving no space for a potential candidate. Similarly in 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
 6 
Bangladesh, years of political feud between two political dynasties lead to politically motivated 
persecution against parties allied with opposition and nearly plunges the whole country into civil 
war (Amundsen, 2013). The dominance of political clans with too much political power will 
crowd out alternative leaders and debilitates political parties (Mendoza et al., 2013).  Thus, lead 
to representative deficit (Dal Bo et al., 2009; Chhibber, 2011; Amundsen, 2013). 
 
Despite these potential criticisms, dynastic management can also induce positive effects. 
Besley and Reynal-Queirol (2015) argued that hereditary transmission of power can play a role 
in improving economic performance when it increases the time horizon (number of terms) that 
politicians face and improves inter-temporal incentives. Evidence suggests that increasing the 
term-length (term tenure) of politicians improve their performance (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011).  
Political dynasties can also serve as a way to allow a woman to enter politics using the political 
capital of the family (Labonne, Parsa and Querubin, 2015). 
 
1.3 Overview of this Thesis 
This thesis is built with 5 chapters with Chapter 1 that covers background and literature review.  
Chapter 2 briefly explains the history of political dynasties in each of the country. Chapter 3 then 
explains the dataset, source and model used in our study. Chapter 4 discusses the review of 
outputs and results. Last but not the least, Chapter 5 covers conclusion and recommendation.  
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Chapter 2.0 Brief History of Political Dynasty in Asia 
This chapter described the lineage of political dynasties in Asia. 
 
2.1 Bangladesh  
Bangladesh’s political institution revolved around of its two most powerful women, Sheikh 
Hasina (Sheikh-Waded Dynasty) and Khaleda Zia (Zia Dynasty). When one becomes leader of 
the ruling government, another will boycott. Amundsen (2013) described the relationship of 
these two women as cutthroat. Their fighting intensity is so huge that it nearly plunges the 
country into civil war. Apart from these dynasties, there are other minor political dynasties. 
 
Table 2: Political Dynasties in Bangladesh
1
 
Dynasty Family Tree Party 
Sheikh-Wazed 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Late* President) 
   +Sheikh Hasina Wazed (PM)  
Awami League 
Zia Ziaur Rahman (Late 7
th
 President) + Khaleda Zia (Ex**-PM) Nationalist Party 
Chowdhury 
Family 
Badruddoza Chowdhury (Late 13
th
 President) 
   +Mahi B. Chowdhury (Ex-MP) 
Bikalpa Dhara  
Huq Family 
A.K. Fazlul Huq  
   +A.K. Faezul Huq (Ex-Minister) 
Ex- Awani 
League 
Abdullah Al 
Mahmood  
Abdullah Al Mahmood  
   +Iqbal Hassan (Ex-MP, Ex-Minister) 
   +Rumana (Ex-MP) 
   +M.A Matin (Ex MP, Ex-Deputy PM) 
Jatiya (Ershad) 
Other minor political dynasties include Mansor and Ahmad dynasties but these dynasties already retired 
from politic.  
*Late refers to decreased  **Ex refers to previously-elected 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Amundsen, Inge. 2013. Dynasty or Democracy? Party Politics in Bangladesh. Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) Brief 
12:6.  
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2.2 India  
As the world largest democracy, India has been long ruled by the INC, which is controlled by the 
prominent Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. It headed the central government for a total 49 years since 
1947. The dynasty has long been target for assassination. Both mother and son, Indira Gandhi 
and Rajiv Gandhi are assassinated in 1984 and 1991 respectively. Sonia Gandhi (wife of Rajiv 
Gandhi). whom was supposed to become PM after sweeping the 2004 general election received 
criticism from opposition due to her Italian citizenship.  Manmohan Singh is chosen for the 
designated position. She remains the head of Indian Congress and chairman of United 
Progressive Alliance.  
 
Unlike many political structures in the world, Indias’s political structure is deeply rooted with 
caste system.  Prior to independence, the Nehru-Gandhi campaigned fairness, equality and caste 
eradication. As times goes by, their position in the social hierarchy strengthened and became part 
of the upper caste. Apart from the Nehru-Gandhi, there are other minor political dynasties (Refer 
Table 4).  
Table 3: Political Dynasties in India 
Dynasty Family Tree Party 
Nehru- 
Gandhi 
Jawaharlal Nehru (Late 1
st
 PM) 
   +Indira Gandhi (Late 3
rd
 PM) 
       ++Rajiv Gandhi (Late 6
th
 PM) 
             +++Rahul Gandhi (MP)  
       ++Maneka Gandhi (Rajiv’s Sister in Law) (MP)* 
INC 
G.K  
Govindaswamy Karuppiah Moopanar (Ex-Minister) 
   +G.K Vasan (Ex-MP, Ex-Minister) 
INC 
There are many political dynasties with majority are provincial political dynasties.  
Provincial level political dynasties include Bose (West Bengal), Bishnoi (Haryana), Ashutosh Mukherjee 
(West Bengal), Shamanur (Karnataka), Rajasekhara Reddy (Andhra Pradesh), Gowda (Karnataka), 
Nandamuri (Andhra Pradesh), Narayan Sinha (Bihar), Satpathy (Odisha) and etc.  
 
Political dynasties that managed to advance into ministry rank include Rajnath, Gupta, Naik, Khurshed, 
Prasad, Pilot and etc.  
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2.3 Indonesia  
In Indonesia, general election and presidential election are linked. A presidential candidate can 
only be nominee if the political party or coalition alliance control at least 20% of the seat in the 
national parliaments or received 25% of votes in the previous national legislature election. By 
law, the president is the head of government, state and armed forces.  
 
Table 4: Political Dynasties in Indonesia 
Dynasty Family Tree Party 
Sukarno 
Sukarno (Ex-1
st
 President) 
+Megawati Sukarno (Ex-5
th
 President)  
PDI-P 
Suharto 
Suharto (Ex-2
nd
 President) 
+Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Ex-Minister) 
Golkar 
Other minor political dynasties are provincial level Chosiyah (Banten), Yasin Limpo (South Sulawesi), 
Alex Noerdin (South Sumartra), and Sjachroedins (Lampung). All of the Indonesia ex-presidents built 
their own dynasty (Wahid, Suharto, and Yudhoyono)
2
.  
 
Sukarno is a freedom fighter that fought both Dutch and Japanese occupation. During his tenure, 
he consolidates his military position and forgoes economic development. His government 
eventually collapsed and Sukarno was put into house arrest. He died of kidney failure at the age 
of 69. His daughter, Megawati joins politics in 1987. She was elected as vice president in 1999 
and promoted to the presidency in 2001. Her rise against the Suharto regime was initially widely 
welcomed but it soon became apparent that her presidency was marked with indecisiveness, lack 
of clear ideological direction, and inability to decide important policy issues. Her popularity 
wanes in the 2004 and 2009 presidential election and the party performed badly under her 
leadership. In 2014 election, she filled Jokowi Widodo as presidential candidate and won. 
Despite not running for re-election, she holds strong influence over PDI-P as chairman and who, 
some argued, is the real power behind the throne
3
.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 Sopian, Najimu. 2013. Political dynasties and the emergence of local oligarchs in post-Suharto Indonesia and the 
Philippines. ResearchGate.  
3
 Devi, Thanusha. 2015. Megawatis show of power reveals PDI-P’s flaw. The Malay Mail 
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2.4 Japan 
As the second largest economy after China in Asia, Japan is also home to few of the oldest, most 
active and conservative political dynasties in the world.  
 
Table 5: Political Dynasties in Japan
4
 
Dynasty Family Tree Dynasty Family Tree 
Hatoyama Hatoyama Kazuo (Late-MP) 
+Ichiro Hatoyama (Late-PM) 
 +Iichiro Hatoyama (Late-Minister)  
     +Yukio Hatoyama (Ex-PM) 
     +Kunio Hatoyama (Late Minister) 
Konoe-
Hosokawa 
Kono Atsumaro (Late-MP) 
+Fumimaro Konoe (Late-MP) 
  +Morihiro Hosokawa (Ex- PM). 
Okawa-
Miyazawa 
Okawa Heikichi (Late Minister) 
 +Miyazawa Hiroshi (Late MP) 
 +Miyazawa Kiichi (Late PM) 
 +Miyazawa Hiroshi (Late Minister) 
     +Yochi Miyazawa (Ex-Minister) 
Kishi-Abe Nobusuke Kishi (Late PM) 
 +Kan Abe (Late Minister) 
   +Shintaro Abe (Late Minister) 
      +Shinzo Abe (PM) 
Okubo-
Yoshido-
Suzuki-
Aso 
Okubo Toshimichi (Late Minister) 
+Makino Nobuoki (Late Minister) 
+Mishima Michitsune (Late 
Governenr) 
   +Shigeru Yoshida (Late PM) 
       +Taro Aso (Ex-PM) 
Koizumi Matajiro Koizumi (Late-MP) 
+Junya Koizumi (Late-Minister) 
   +Junichiro Koizumi (Ex-PM) 
       +Shinjiro Koizumi (MP) 
Other prominent dynasties are Saigo-Oyama, Nakasone, Fududa, Obuchi and Tanaka dynasties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Asako, Yasushi., Iida, Takeshi., Matsubayashi. Tetsuya., and Ueda, Michiko. 2012. Dynastic Politician: Theory 
and Evidence from Japan. Waseda University Organization for Japan-US Studies, Working Paper No.201201. and 
Wikipedia. 2016. List of Political Families.  
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
  
 
Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Database”.  
Fulltexts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on 
http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary 
loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn 
for delivery details. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
